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ABSTRACT 
 
The onward development of information and communication 
technology has led to a new industrial revolution called Industry 
4.0. This revolution involves Cyber-Physical Production Systems 
(CPPS), which consist of intelligent Cyber-Physical Systems that 
may be able to adapt themselves autonomously in a production 
environment. At the moment, machines in industrial 
environments are often not connected to the internet, which thus 
needs a point-to-point connection to access the device if 
necessary. Through Industry 4.0, these devices should enable 
remote access for smart maintenance through a connection to the 
outside world. However, this connection opens the gate for 
possible cyber-attacks and thus raises the question about 
providing security for these environments. Therefore, this paper 
used an adapted approach based on SixSigma to solve this 
security problem by investigating security standards. Security 
requirements were gathered and mapped to controls from well 
known security standards, formed into a catalog. This catalog 
includes assessment information to  check how secure a solution 
for a use case is and also includes a link to an estimation method 
for implementation cost. Thus this paper’s outcome shows how 
to make Industry 4.0 use cases secure by fulfilling security 
standard controls and how to estimate the resulting 
implementation costs.  
 
Keywords: Industry 4.0, cyber-physical systems, requirements 
engineering, standard compliance, security, remote access, costs 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Through the fourth industrial revolution, called Industry 4.0, 
which involves Cyber-Physical Production Systems (CPPS), 
boundaries of companies deteriorate. This is caused by the use of 
embedded systems and their exchange of data across the entire 
value chain [1]. Industrial Control Systems (ICS), for example 
machines with sensors for monitoring manufacturing and process 
automation within a production company serve as one of the 
basics for Industry 4.0. These machines have been traditionally 
built as stand-alone systems, not connected to the outside world 
and only accessible via point-to-point connection. Thus, 
maintaining these machines might cause an overhead, since it 
often includes to physically move them in order to be able to 
establish a connection. To improve the maintenance, process a 
transformation to Industry 4.0 [2] could enable remote access, 
which allows servicing the machine from outside. 
However, by no longer isolating ICS, the gates for numerous 
cyber-attacks are opened and thus organizations must understand 
the potential risks for that. Before opening such a system to the 
outside world, it is important to know i) what to do in order to be 
secure and ii) how much it costs to do so. Thus, being able to 
provide a secure remote access is as important as providing a 
secure end-to-end communication in Industry 4.0. Since for the 
latter a lot of research work is done (e.g. in [3], [4], [5], [6]) this 
paper provides an approach how to make a use case secure for 
Industry 4.0 environments based on security standards and what 
costs for this security implementation can be estimated.  
To achieve this, the approach adapted in this paper is based on 
SixSigma. Therefore, requirements are gathered and security 
standards are used to find appropriate controls addressing these 
requirements. Afterwards these outcomes are mapped into a 
requirements and controls catalog, which also includes 
assessment of controls and cost estimation for the 
implementation of controls. Through an experimental evaluation 
the usage of this approach’s outcome is done to show it’s 
applicability and implementation options. The method was 
adapted with other use cases in mind, which can be used for 
future work. The contributions of this paper are thus twofold:  
• Firstly, an approach of how to design a secure Industry 4.0 
application by fulfilling security standard controls and  
• secondly, an approach for estimating the implementation 
costs to build such an application 
Both should help building and implementing a cost aware and 
secure application for Industry 4.0. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: Section 2 shows related work concerning 
the most important topics regarding this paper’s method and how 
this work can be used or enhanced. Next, section 3 describes the 
methodology by explaining in detail each step of the used 
SixSigma approach. Based on that, section 4 shows in a step by 
step evaluation how the presented approach can be used to 
provide security and estimate the resulting costs for an industrial 
use case. Finally, in section 5 we summarize the approach 
including the evaluation results and give an outline for possible 
future work. 
 
2.  RELATED WORK 
 
Brettel et al. [1] have investigated the topic Industry 4.0 in 
general. They have analyzed 8 different research journals 
concerning the topics individual production, end-to-end 
engineering in a virtual process chain and production networks 
through cluster analysis and also held face to face interviews with 
industry managers. Their results showed from a managerial 
viewpoint why companies adapt or refuse Industry 4.0 
technologies. Their outputs should also help decision makers to 
assess if transformation to Industry 4.0 within their companies is 
needed. Further general work [7] has also investigated general 
Industry 4.0 aspects, more precisely design principles for 
Industry 4.0 scenarios. Through a quantitative and qualitative 
text and literature analysis and review, their outcome was the 
provision of design principles to create a common understanding 
of the term Industry 4.0 for reasonable scientific discussion and 
also through a case study the paper can help identify potential use 
cases for Industry 4.0. Both papers are used to explain basics of 
Industry 4.0 and also to help identifying important general topics. 
Our work will also include general explanation for Industry 4.0 
and enhance it by prensting an actual Industry 4.0 use case.  
Bicaku et al. [3] have proposed a solution to investigate 
automated standard compliance to assure that individual Industry 
4.0 components are secured to interoperate. The basis of that are 
  
given sets of security and safety requirements from which 
measurable indicator points are derived. An initial approach to 
automate such assessment when components are inter-operating 
with each other is done by using a monitoring and standard 
compliance verification framework. Our work builds on this 
effort of checking security standard compliance and extends it by 
evaluating a use case scenario for Industry 4.0 by investigating 
corresponding requirements and thus deriving standards, controls 
and costs for implementing secure Industry 4.0 applications. 
Schmittner et al. [8] have investigated the combination of safety 
and security for trustworthy cyber-physical systems and explain 
that in the past safety and security were handled as separate issues 
but now with Industry 4.0 and the interconnection of each device, 
they must be handled as one part. This combination needs new 
concepts, techniques and tools, which this special issue 
addresses. This paper considers this relation in mind and focuses 
on addressing such security issues.  
The papers of the BMWi [5], [6] aim to define a simple and 
overall position about basic requirements, security challenges 
and diverse approaches for secure communication in Industry 4.0 
environments. They also give a deeper look at the C-I-A triangle 
(Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability) in Industry 4.0 and 
authenticity. Our work makes use of these results, especially of 
CIA and authenticity for deriving requirements and thus 
standards, controls and costs.  
In our previous work [9] we have introduced a new method of 
measuring the costs of cyber security in smart business. It 
presents an initial evaluation of the costs of cyber security using 
a high-level process flow based on Six Sigma. The limitations of 
this work were that a fictional use case was used, the cost analysis 
was performed only during design time and it used only a 
monetary cost metric (Euro). Therefore, this work extends these 
methodologies of measuring costs of security by evaluating and 
adapting the approach to the remote access requirements and 
controls evaluation taxonomy. Furthermore, the derivation of 
costs can also be considered and adapted to the costs in this work. 
In [10], Yee provides a summary of related work regarding 
security metrics by establishing the argument that many security 
controls and metrics exist, but most of them are not effective or 
necessary. Afterwards, a definition of possible and not possible 
controls is provided and furthermore described what the 
difference between conventional and scientifically/reliably- 
based security controls is. The procedure of this work can serve 
for the identification of controls for this paper and extends it by 
finding usable possible “good” controls for the catalog. 
Strobl et al. [11] have identified threats, vulnerabilities and their 
impact of connected cars in their paper. The aim of the paper was 
to identify blocks of established technologies in a connected car 
and to consolidate the corresponding threat and vulnerability 
catalogs relevant for the individual constituent components. 
These findings are used to estimate the impact on specific system 
components and subsystems to identify the most crucial 
components and threats including cloud computing. Our paper 
was also motivated by this approach of gathering controls for the 
collection of controls for the requirements and controls catalog 
including costs. Although the topics vary in our work, the build-
up of the catalog can be used as a possible example for the 
requirements and controls catalog and extends it by adding new 
approaches. 
Specifying security requirements is an important task to develop 
critical information systems. Several standards help to handle 
security requirements. Thus, Mellado et al. [12] present a 
common criteria centered and reuse-based process dealing with 
security requirements at an early stage of e.g. software 
development in a systematic and new way. This is done by 
providing security resource repository and by integrating them in 
the early stages of the software lifecycle, unifying concepts of 
requirements engineering and security engineering. So, they 
show a standard-based process that deals with the security 
requirements at early stages of software development but do not 
concern security and cost in Industry 4.0. In contrast to this work 
this paper shows an approach of standard-based security 
requirements engineering actually providing a catalog with 
requirements adapted to a use case with an intuitive way, so it 
could be reused and also integrating a cost estimation method. 
In this work [13] a systematic review of security requirements 
engineering is performed, which is done by a systematic review 
of existing literature concerning security requirements 
engineering. This review was used to show that there are too     
less of these important reviews and to provide a framework/ 
background, in which to appropriately position new research 
activities. Therefore, this reference provides a summary of all 
existing information about security requirements in a thorough 
and unbiased manner. Their main contribution includes precision 
and reliability of the information and the results obtained. This 
paper will examine such security requirements engineering 
sources and will provide a way based on SixSigma to come to 
security requirements and concerning costs through the help of 
standards. 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper focuses on fulfilling security standard controls as well 
as on the cost for implementing these. For this, the most 
important requirements and security standard controls for a use 
case are evaluated and based on that the needed implementation 
costs are estimated. An approach on how to derive these 
necessary requirements and controls was formed by asking the 
questions:  
1. What does security in Industry 4.0 mean? – Based on our 
experience, it means to be compliant to security standards. 
Thus, requirements are necessary to define what needs to be 
secured.  
2. How can requirements be fulfilled? – By using controls 
from security standards (= measures, which can be used to 
assess if something, in this case, is secure). 
The outcome should be a requirements and controls catalog, 
which should present the information about security standard 
controls in such a way that the costs for implementing them can 
be derived. For this catalog and cost derivation, a taxonomy is 
needed to develop a method, which can be easily reused. A 
simple taxonomy can be derived from Six Sigma. The Six Sigma 
approach was developed by Motorola in the 1980s and is one of 
the foremost methodical practices for improving customer 
satisfaction and business processes. The idea behind the 
approach was to remove causes of errors when detected before 
they lead to defects in a product or service, which leads to more 
cost-efficiency. This is achieved by the Six Sigma DMAIC 
approach, which stands for Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, 
Control. This approach can be used for many use cases, e.g. 
identifying cloud security risks [9] or in this case for gathering 
security controls. Thus, the steps for this approach are shown in 
Figure 1, in which the numbers in brackets () are used to describe 
exactly what every step means below the figure. 
  
 
Figure 1: Methodology based on SixSigma 
 
The goal of this methodology is to put an Industry 4.0 security 
use case through a hopper to start the DMAIC approach (1). 
Afterwards the application wanders through every step of the 
approach: 
Define (2): Identification of the requirements. 
Measure (3): Based on the requirements, finding security controls 
from existing security standards. 
Analyze (4): Mapping of requirements to controls and including 
it in a catalog. A set of controls, addressing a specific requirement, 
is extracted from each standard, e.g. to address requirement 1, 
control 1 and 2 must be implemented. Furthermore, similar 
controls per requirement are summarized to control groups. For 
instance, for guaranteeing a secure connection, two different 
standards might suggest using a specific encryption algorithm as 
a security control. The catalog combines these similar controls 
from the standards in one group. 
Improve (5): To improve the catalog from the previous step, this 
phase provides guidance for how to assess implementing these 
security controls also including an equation for measuring the 
resulting costs. 
Control (6): Finally, the control phase uses the requirements and 
controls catalog to find possible solutions for the presented use 
case. The goal here is to show i) how well the solutions support 
the security controls from the used standards and ii) how much it 
costs to implement missing security controls. 
After finishing these steps, the outcome is a rating of importance 
for security requirements as well as a cost implementation 
estimation and thus a secure and cost aware solution (7). If, 
during the Control phase no appropriate solutions were found, 
the DMAIC approach can be done again (1), which is explained 
in detail in the Control part of section 4. In this paper only one 
iteration is done because appropriate solutions were found during 
the Control phase. To show the described methodology in action, 
the next section presents a remote-access use case concerning 
Industry 4.0 and its iteration through the defined SixSigma 
approach. 
 
4.  EVALUATION 
 
In the last section, we presented an approach for evaluating a use 
case through the help of defined taxonomy based on SixSigma to 
check if it fulfills security controls and also to estimate possible 
implementation costs. In this chapter, we will apply the defined 
methodology step by step, by first introducing the use case and 
then put it through each DMAIC step. 
 
Use Case 
In the following section, we demonstrate the first step of our 
approach through an industrial use case. The use case at the 
moment concerns measurement devices, which are connected to 
the company’s local network with strict access rights. Currently, 
if a measurement device needs maintenance, it has to be serviced 
by accessing it via a point-to-point connection, which is a long 
lasting and unnecessarily complex process. Thus, the company 
decides to add to their measurement devices a remote access 
functionality. The new remote access use case has the following 
two basic goals: (i) providing an alternative way of accessing the 
device, and (ii) enabling quick and qualified support and 
maintenance from outside the company. Through the application 
of this remote access from outside, new security challenges arise, 
which this paper addresses through adding a check for standard 
controls implementation and its cost estimation. 
 
 
Figure 2: Use Case setup 
 
Figure 2 shows the setup of the use case. On the left, there is 
Location A where the measurement device is in place. The right 
side of the picture represents another “outside” Location B, 
where the remote access to the device is needed. The whole 
solution is based on a message broker where location A is the 
publisher and location B is the subscriber. In Location A, the 
measurement device is only accessible through the customer’s 
local area network therefore a remote access through an IoT 
Gateway is needed. The IoT Gateway can be seen as a 
programmed, intelligent switch, which can connect to the internet 
and establish an encrypted connection to a message broker in 
another location. A remote access server with a remote access 
web portal acts as a subscriber to the topic of the IoT Gateway, 
through which Location B can now directly access the device. 
 
Define 
The first step of the DMAIC approach is now used to identify 
requirements. Therefore, requirements were gathered based on 
CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) [5] and extended 
with necessary requirements based on a use case and industry 
(which we call CIA extension) but also held on a general level 
with other use cases in mind. The six identified requirements 
were: Identification & Authentication [IA], Data Integrity [DI], 
Data Confidentiality [DC], Encryption [EC], Availability [AV] 
and Communication Channels [CC].  
 
Measure 
The next step was to identify controls from appropriate standards 
based on the requirements and the use case. These can of course 
vary from use case to use case or company. For the catalog, more 
than 5 Standards were found most appropriate. These standards 
have a high international reputation and therefore fit perfectly for 
the catalog. For the described Industry 4.0 remote access use case 
the following standards were used (split up in three parts caused 
by same controls specification): IEC 62443-3-3 [14], ISO/IEC 
27000 series (27001 [15], 27002 [16], 27017 [17], 27018 [18]) 
and NIST SP (800-53 [19], 800-82 [20]). Based on these 
standards, controls related to the remote access use case were 
extracted. 
 
Analyze 
In this phase, requirements, controls and standards were mapped 
into a catalog and grouped in control groups that contain similar 
controls. Figure 3 shows the build up of the catalog: gathering 
requirements by the use of the in section 3 explained CIA 
extension and mapping controls of standards to them. The look 
of the catalog will be shown in Table 1 in the Improve phase. 
f 
  
 
Figure 3: Buildup of the requirements and controls catalog 
 
 
Figure 4: Controls identified per requirement and standard 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of controls within the 
requirements and controls catalog across the standards. The 
figure shows the number of controls for each requirement and 
standard. Through this figure we can identify that e.g. the NIST 
standards have the highest number of controls concerning [IA] 
(thin grey line 0-35) whereas for [EC] all standards have a very 
low number of controls. Nevertheless, [IA] heavily depends on 
[EC] so dependabilities also need to be considered when 
implementing controls. But overall it is possible to say that 
identification & authentication have the most controls. 
Therefore, the most important requirement and controls that need 
to be considered for the whole remote access, also in combination 
with the underlying infrastructure and every part of it is [IA] and 
thus needs to be well considered before implementation. It also 
shows that NIST standards have the highest number of controls 
on most requirements. This Figure 4 is an important output of the 
paper because it shows a company what is most important for 
security, in this case, for the remote access use case. 
 
Improve 
The following Table 1 shows the build-up of the requirements 
and controls catalog, which also includes the mapping of 
requirements and controls from the Analyze phase. Moreover, it 
adds the assessment column and afterwards in equation (1) to (3) 
it shows the cost estimation method. The original catalog 
includes over 120 controls and spans over more than 20 pages, 
which can thus be not included in the paper. Nevertheless, Table 
1 should give an overview of how the catalog looks like by 
showing the control groups for one requirement, Identification & 
Authentication. The controls for each requirement are grouped to 
control groups (column ID), which have the same/similar content 
(column Control IDs shows which controls are in this group). The 
assessment column then explains what these controls are about 
and how to assess if a used technology/application to solve a use 
case implements these security standards controls or not. The 
build-up of the table is as follows: 
• Requirement (Req.) 
• ID within the catalog (ID) = Control group ID 
• concerning Controls IDs (Control IDs) 
• Assessment information (Assessment) 
Req. ID Control IDs Assessment 
IA 
(Req. n) 
1 [IEC-1] [IEC-2] 
[IEC-3] [IEC-4] 
[IEC-6] [IEC-8] 
[ISO-02-4] 
[ISO-02-5] 
[ISO-02-6] 
[ISO-02-8] 
[ISO-02-10] 
[NIST-53-1] 
[NIST-53-2] 
[NIST-53-4] 
[NIST-53-5] 
[NIST-53-18] 
[NIST-53-22] 
[NIST-53-23] 
[NIST-53-31] 
Account & access management, 
including rights, duties, least 
privilege and access control. To 
address these controls following 
must be implemented in the use 
case to be in accordance with the 
standards: 
-Unified policies 
-Passwords, tokens, biometrics, 
etc. 
-General account management 
enabled (grouping, least 
privilege...) 
IA 2 [17 controls]  
IA 3 [5 controls]  
Table 1: Extract from requirements and controls catalog 
 
Through the assessment column the requirements and controls 
catalog can thus serve as a controls fulfilment checklist as well 
as implementation recommendation guide. When assessing use 
case solutions with the catalog, a point system per control group 
should be used: Fully applicable gives 1 point, partly applicable 
0,5 points and not applicable 0 points. The Control phase will 
show this assessment in detail. 
Next, the challenge was to extend Table 1 with a column for an 
estimation of possible implementation cost. Therefore, the steps 
for the cost estimation are shown in equations (1), (2) and (3). 
 𝑐𝑡 = 	 𝑐%%&' 									𝑐%	 ∈ 1  
 𝑐𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥({𝑐𝑡', 𝑐𝑡1, … , 𝑐𝑡3}) 
 
IE = 676789: 
 
ct count = number of controls per control group 𝑐%  control 
ctMax count maximum = highest number of controls over all 
control groups of one requirement 
IE Implementation Effort, result of equation 
 
The following example Table 2 shows the steps how to come to 
the estimation of the implementation effort with the example of 
control group 1, 2 and 3 from requirement [IA] (see Table 1): 
 
 Control group 1 Control group 2 Control group 3 
1 𝑐𝑡' = 	 1%&' = 19	 𝑐𝑡1 = 	 1%&' = 17 𝑐𝑡1 = 	 1%&' = 5 
2 𝑐𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {19, 17, 5} = 	19 
3 IE1= 
'>'>=1  IE2 = '?'>=0,89 IE3 = @'>= 0,26  
Table 2: Cost estimation evaluation example 
 
 
Req. Control 
group ID 
Nr. of controls per 
group (ct) 
Implementation 
Effort (IE) 
[IA] 1 19 1 
2 17 0,89 
3 5 0,26 
Table 3: Cost estimation results 
 
To illustrate the cost derivation method results, Table 3 shows all 
control groups for one requirement, which is in this case again 
Identification & Authentication. The build-up of this table is thus 
almost the same as Table 1 but instead of every Control ID it is 
(1) 
(3) 
(2) 
  
the number of Control IDs (ct) and instead of the assessment it 
contains the implementation effort (IE). Equation (1), (2) and (3) 
above show how the implementation effort is derived. Table 2 
shows how the equations are used: Every number of controls per 
control group (𝑐𝑡) is divided through the highest number of 
controls over all three groups (ctMax), which is in this case 19 
from control group 1, which leads to the implementation effort 
column of Table 3. Control group 3 in this case has the lowest 
implementation costs with 0,26, whereas control group 1 and 2 
have high implementation costs with its implementation effort 1 
and 0,89. The definition of high or low has to be done by the 
person or company itself that examines a certain use case because 
implementation effort can vary a lot. This method was used 
because implementing more controls means more e.g. time or 
working hours, which lead to higher costs. The method does not 
bring an exact cost estimation for implementation costs but it 
should give an overview and a feeling of how high or low the 
implementation of certain controls will be. This estimation of 
costs can be done with every requirement from the catalog. 
Figure 4 shows on an overall scale that Identification & 
Authentication has the most controls, which has through this 
approach the highest implementation costs because like Table 3 
shows: more controls = higher cost based on the  assumption that 
the costs for implementing the controls are the same. 
 
Control 
In this section, the Control phase of the SixSigma DMAIC 
approach is shown. It was done by evaluating possible platforms 
for the implementation of the remote access use case by the help 
of the requirements and controls catalog to show its applicability 
and to get the best security standard controls implemented 
solution. Based on the remote access use case and gathered 
requirements, 5 possible platforms as solution for it were found 
by using a research taxonomy: The platforms (i) should have at 
least one security certification, (ii) should already be used in 
Industry 4.0 use cases (two or more references), (iii) must already 
include on the website information regarding authentication, 
encryption & user management, which are key parts of the 
requirements and (iv) search keywords must include at least 2 of 
these keywords: remote access, IoT, Industry 4.0. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Overall platform evaluation results 
 
At first these platforms were assessed against the catalog on a 
superficial, non-implementation level just with the 
documentation for these solutions. Figure 5 shows the 
applicability of the solutions for the use case per requirement 
(done with the point assessment from explained in the Improve 
phase). Next to the other found solutions (Secomea [21], 
Teamviewer [22] IoT, Prima Power Remote Care [23] and 
Endian [24]), Eclipse IoT [25] was the only fully applicable 
solution, which met the requirements and was then 
experimentally evaluated in detail. 
 
Figure 6: Requirements applicability on Eclipse IoT from 0-1 
 
Eclipse IoT’s solution (Kapua and Kura applications for remote 
access) were then implemented and again in detail evaluated 
against the requirements and controls catalog. The main outcome 
should then show that the overall evaluation must have rather the 
same outcome than the detailed one concerning one specific 
platform. The point evaluation for Figure 6 is the same as the one 
used for Figure 5. But here the control groups itself have been 
investigated in more detail through a setup, therefore the data 
ranges more. The most important security requirement of the 
platform is according to Figure 4 Identification & 
Authentication, which Eclipse IoT nearly fulfills except the 
policies, which need to be established by the company itself in 
advance, thus not part of this evaluation. Also, Encryption is 
well-included in Eclipse IoT, which is a very important 
requirement because it is also a part of all other gathered 
requirements. All 6 requirements are partly or fully fulfilled and 
have about 5 out of 6 achievable points, which is nearly the same 
outcome of the overall evaluation and thus shows the 
applicability of the requirements and controls catalog as a 
checklist. However, if the goal is to fulfill all requirements, the 
outcome of this phase provides the following three 
implementation possibilities: (i) if the missing parts have to be 
developed, the resulting costs could be estimated by using the 
presented method from the Improve phase; (ii) two or more 
solutions, which by themselves only partly fulfill the 
requirements, might fulfill all requirements when being 
combined; (iii) in case (i) and (ii) do not apply, another iteration 
of the DMAIC process (including other standards) could provide 
additional solutions. 
 
Results 
The main contribution of the paper is the approach shown in 
Figure 1. Based on this general approach, Industry 4.0 use cases 
can be assessed, security controls found and resulting 
implementation cost evaluated. In this regard the approach 
provides the following two main outcomes: (i) Figure 4 could be 
used to rate the requirements by their importance, where more 
controls are considered more important than less. (ii) This rating 
further leads to equations (1), (2) and (3), which allow to estimate 
the costs for implementing the identified security controls. 
Further results include Table 1, which shows the catalog for 
checking if an application fulfills certain controls. Also, the 
Control phase shows results by presenting the applicability of the 
catalog on applications and also by showing appropriate 
solutions for the remote access use case implementation. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper focuses on an approach on how to build secure and 
cost aware Industry 4.0 application. The first focus for achieving 
this was on investigating security. Based on the SixSigma 
DMAIC approach, security requirements were defined and 
  
controls in standards, which show how to achieve these, were 
gathered. Then a requirements and controls catalog regarding an 
Industry 4.0 remote access use case was formed. This catalog 
should help implement secure Industry 4.0 applications through 
the check if solutions fulfill controls and how much controls need 
to be implemented to be secure. Results included the rating of the 
most important requirements.  
The second focus of the paper was on costs for implementing the 
most needed controls. Therefore, an approach of deriving 
implementation costs based on controls identified per control 
group within the catalog was presented. This result gives an 
implementation cost estimation to get an overview of what it will 
appropriately cost when implementing these. To show the 
applicability of the catalog and thus the Control phase of 
DMAIC, an evaluation was done with remote access applications 
to check on an overall and detailed level the applicability of this 
derived catalog. The outcome was a platform for the use case, 
which is the most secure one according to the catalog check. 
Future work in general includes the adaptation of the catalog to 
different scenarios by expanding it or adding more standards. 
Further future work would be an automatic assessment of 
solutions with the requirements and controls catalog to expand 
e.g. existing work, which investigates automated standard 
compliance for monitoring [3]. It would also be interesting to do 
a more detailed implementation of the solutions with appropriate 
underlying infrastructure in a real Industry 4.0 environment. 
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